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Abstract: 
We distinguish between two different strategies in economic methodology. The big picture 
strategy, dominant in the twentieth century, ascribed to economics a unified method and 
evaluated this method against a single criterion of ‘science’. In the last thirty years a second 
strategy gained prominence: fine-grained studies of how some specific technique common in 
economics can achieve one or more epistemic goal. We argue that recent developments in 
philosophy of science and in economics warrant a return to big-picture – but now reinvented. 
It should focus on a new question, already intensely debated within the profession: is the 
organization of economics healthy and appropriate? 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The history of methodology of economics has seen two different strategies. At times, 
methodologists have analyzed economics as a whole, ascribing to it a single epistemic 
approach and appealing to a standard against which this approach can be evaluated. At other 
times, they have pursued a more circumscribed enquiry, into how some specific technique 
common in economics can achieve one or more epistemic goal. Label the first strategy big-
picture, and the second strategy fine-grained. Roughly speaking, the big-picture strategy 
prevailed up to the 1990s, but in the last thirty years the dominant mode has been fine-
grained. 
 
We argue that recent developments in philosophy of science and in economics warrant a 
return to big-picture – but now reinvented. It should not inherit the old presumption that 
economics has a single method, or that there is a single criterion of ‘science’. Instead, it 
should focus on a new question, already intensely debated within the profession: is the 
organization of economics healthy and appropriate? This question is big-picture. Although 
any answer to it must ride on the back of fine-grained work, fine-grained work alone is not 
enough. It is also ripe for explicit and systematic examination by methodologists because a 
proper answer requires the skills and knowledge of our community. We illustrate how a 
revived big-picture strategy is fruitful for two controversies: how much effort to devote to 
rational choice modeling, and how economics is socially organized. 
 
2. Big-picture versus fine-grained 
The big-picture approach has a long, proud history. It stretches back to John Stuart Mill, who 
defended political economy as a science that studies phenomena that arise from the pursuit of 
wealth. In the twentieth century, big-picture theorists borrowed from influential general 
accounts of scientific method and scientific change, especially those of Karl Popper, Thomas 
Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos. The concepts of demarcation, paradigm, and progressive research 
program got deployed either to vindicate economics as a legitimate science or to criticize it 
for not being one. The heyday of big-picture methodology of economics was the 1970s to 
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1990s, a period in which the best-known participants in our field, such as Mark Blaug, Bruce 
Caldwell, Jon Elster, Uskali Mäki, and Deidre McCloskey, all took a stance on the overall 
‘status of economics’. (Heterodox economists, such as Tony Lawson, Ben Fine, and Frederic 
Lee, have continued to pronounce on the status of the discipline as a whole, but they have had 
a different audience.) This heyday culminated in 1992, with Dan Hausman’s Inexact and 
Separate Science of Economics and Alex Rosenberg’s Mathematical Politics. Both of these 
exemplified the big-picture approach even as they reached vastly different verdicts: there is a 
distinctive strategy to economics, and this strategy can be judged against a compelling 
criterion. 
 
More recently there has been a turn towards the fine-grained, at least among scholars who 
publish in journals such as this one. The big-picture accounts do still appear on teaching 
syllabi and retain historical interest. But it is now rare to hear scholarly verdicts on whether 
economics as a whole is a science, or to encounter attempts to ascribe to it a single overall 
strategy. When such attempts do appear, such as Dani Rodrik’s 2015 book Economics Rules, 
they are usually aimed at a general audience, with the goal of correcting common 
misconceptions. Professional scholarship in methodology of economics instead prizes more 
specific contributions, such as the precise inferences that may or may not be warranted by 
models, by randomized controlled trials, by economic experiments, or by measurement of 
indicators. Mireles-Flores’s recent review paper (2018) picks out modeling and explanation, 
causal inference and evidence, and behavioral economics as the three most active research 
topics. Today’s doctoral dissertations and journal articles display intricate knowledge of 
economic practice, and this level of detail in turn demands a focus on specific models or 
theories rather than on economics as a whole. 
 
Why has our field gone fine-grained? General philosophy of science has moved on from the 
classic mid-century focus on the demarcation problem, and has largely given up on the idea 
of a single scientific method or a unified criterion of scientific success. Historians, 
sociologists, and philosophers have delivered a consistent message that science is hospitable 
to distinctive epistemic cultures and that evaluating these cultures requires sensitivity to local 
circumstances and constraints. One field may rely on simulations, another on fieldwork; one 
looks for general theories, another for toy models; one prizes unification, another rich 
ethnography. None is superior to all others in all dimensions. To capture this complexity and 
richness, philosophers of physical and life sciences have often relied on case studies. The 
lessons from these are illuminating and valuable without being universal or general.  
 
This spirit of case-driven philosophy of science has percolated through. Methodologists have 
recognized that economics is more diverse than the original big-picture accounts made it 
look. Rational choice modeling typically hogged attention and determined the agenda. But 
powerful and influential though it is, rational choice modeling hardly defines all of 
economics, and paying close attention to econometrics, welfare analysis, or experimental 
work makes it harder to ascribe a single epistemic strategy to the discipline as a whole. There 
are many strategies and many criteria of success. A good economic experiment may be prized 
for virtues that are entirely distinct from the virtues of a good rational choice model, and this 
variety makes it hard to pass a single ‘yea or nay’ verdict on economics as a whole. No 
wonder today’s methodologists delve into the details of specific economic projects such as 
mechanism design, causal inference using instrumental variables, or the measurement of 
consumption. 
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There were good reasons to go fine-grained. But the fine-grained status quo also has 
downsides. Methodologists focus on specific techniques and, as they debate with each other 
what these techniques can and cannot achieve, their stances grow nuanced and intricate. This 
emphasis on nuance takes attention away from trends in economics as a whole. Yet 
discipline-wide trends arguably impact on the fortunes of economics more strongly than do 
further nuances of fine-grained issues. These wider trends demand our attention. Armed with 
the rich understanding of detail that the fine-grained era has delivered, methodologists are 
now well-positioned to make good on that obligation. We offer two examples.  
 
3. The efficiency question 
Recent methodology of economics has been preoccupied perhaps more than anything else by 
the status of rational choice models. These models dominate mainstream work. What are 
they, how do they represent, and perhaps above all: do they explain? If they do explain, in 
what sense?  
 
Fine-grained work has greatly elucidated these debates (Marchionni 2017). But regardless of 
whether economic models do indeed explain, all sides agree that they are sometimes useful 
and sometimes not, whether that usefulness consists in explanations or in something else. 
Practically speaking, what matters is a different debate: should economists do more rational 
choice modeling or should they invest their efforts elsewhere? We cannot answer this 
question without specifying alternatives: qualitative methods such as interviews and 
ethnographic observation; questionnaires; small-N causal inference, such as qualitative 
comparative analysis; causal process tracing; causal inference from observational statistics; 
machine learning from big data; historical case studies; randomized controlled trials; 
laboratory experiments; and natural and quasi-experiments. All of these alternative methods 
are widely practiced in other sciences. All of them can generate results that, in a virtuous 
circle, feed back into more theory development. The latter few of these methods have begun 
to be co-opted by mainstream economics already. But which mix of methods is optimal? 
Label this the efficiency question (Northcott 2018). It is a big-picture issue. 
 
To answer the efficiency question requires, so to speak, an epistemic cost-benefit analysis. 
The costs are the resources invested into modeling, such as mathematical training of students, 
and perhaps more notably the opportunity costs, such as fieldwork methods not taught and 
fieldwork not done. The benefits are whatever successful explanations, predictions and 
interventions such modeling leads to. What is the optimal balance between, on one hand, 
building up a library of orthodox models, and on the other hand, pursuing more applied, 
contextual work and utilizing a wider range of methods?  
 
Of course, this cost-benefit analysis can only be done imperfectly and approximately. It is 
hard to count up explanations and predictions in an objective way, hard to weigh these versus 
other goals of science, and hard also to evaluate the counterfactual of whether a different 
allocation of resources would be better. But, implicitly, such analyses are unavoidable and 
are being done already – every time a researcher chooses, or a graduate school teaches, one 
method rather than another, or journals or prizes or hirers choose one paper or candidate 
rather than another. (This is true even though other factors enter such decisions too.) The 
status quo is not inevitable, as shown by different practices in other social sciences. It is 
surely better for methodologists to tackle this question explicitly rather than to leave it to 
inertia and sociological winds.  
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Recently, the discipline itself has, in effect, been addressing the efficiency question, 
reflecting that question’s importance. We have in mind the much-remarked ‘empirical turn’. 
In the five most prestigious journals in economics, the percentage of papers that are purely 
theoretical – i.e. free of any empirical data – fell from 57% in 1983 to 19% in 2011 
(Hamermesh 2013). Not only is there more empirical work in prestigious venues but also this 
empirical work is more often ‘a-theoretical’ rather than theory-based, i.e. it more often 
establishes previously untheorized causal relations rather than tests already-existing 
theoretical models. Biddle and Hamermesh (2016) report that whereas in the 1970s all 
microeconomic empirical papers in top-5 journals exhibited a theoretical framework, in the 
2000s a-theoretical studies resurged. Citation numbers suggest that the a-theoretical work is 
at least as influential. Angrist and Pischke (2010) also report the rise of a-theoretical practice 
in several subfields. Other evidence besides, such as the work of recent Clark medal winners, 
shows the same trend. 
 
The empirical turn is an implicit answer to the efficiency question. It reflects a discipline-
wide shift in research emphasis away from pure theory towards empirical application.  
It shows that the discipline’s norms and incentives allow it to make such a shift. It now 
becomes incumbent on methodologists to evaluate this shift. So far, remarkably little has 
been said by methodologists about the empirical turn, even though it is the biggest recent 
trend in the discipline. Historians have described and contextualized this transformation, but 
without taking an evaluative stance (Backhouse and Cherrier 2017). Is the empirical turn a 
good thing? This is just another way of formulating the efficiency question. On either 
formulation, it is a big-picture not fine-grained issue. 
 
4. Social organization of economics  
Some of the most voracious and contested topics at economics conferences and in economics 
media (podcasts, forums, Twitter) concern how economists relate to one another. Do female 
economists face an adverse environment? Do economists from certain universities receive 
undue attention? These topics have received scholarly attention: historians and social 
scientists, from anthropologists to economists themselves, have presented rich data on who 
gets attention, who governs, which kinds of people succeed, and how economists think of 
outsiders. But methodologists have said little. This is surprising because much recent work in 
philosophy of science, political philosophy, and social epistemology focuses on how social 
norms and participation impacts on knowledge-making practices (Kitcher 2001, Longino 
2002, Anderson 2020). Inquiring into how economics is organized raises questions that 
deserve methodological attention. Does the distribution of power in economics aid progress? 
Does a lack of female economists lead to missing topics or less robust research? Label these 
social organizational questions. They are big-picture. 
 
Consider the distribution of prestige and influence. Publications in the top 5 journals play a 
significant role in determining career success (Heckman and Moktan 2020). Economists are 
prone to elevating star individuals disproportionately, as shown by the attention, authority, 
and citations afforded to those that win the big prizes. The American Economic Association is 
dominated by economists from a few top US departments, much more so than the governing 
bodies of other social sciences (Fourcade et al. 2015). Those employed or trained at the same 
few top departments also dominate among the authors and editors of the top journals (Colussi 
2018). Hiring prestige, whereby departments hire only from similar or higher-ranked 
departments, exists in many academic fields, but it too is stronger in economics (Han 2003). 
These factors and more highlight large inequities of power and opportunity and a steep 
hierarchy within the discipline. 
5 
 
 
Why should methodologists and economists care? Because even if individual economists 
diligently follow appropriate methods – the subject matter of fine-grained methodology – 
hierarchy effects might still hinder economics as a whole from self-correcting and developing 
new knowledge. The dominance of the top 5 journals encourages instrumental reasoning at 
the beginning of research projects and creates incentives against innovative methods and 
topics (Heckman et al. 2017). And the dominance of a small subset of economists amplifies 
the common bias that academics have in favor of work like their own (Akerlof and Michaillat 
2018). Both of these factors put a damper on new methods and topics for inquiry and on their 
ability to gain attention. As well as impeding new knowledge, these factors also undercut 
existing knowledge: with fewer new ideas, existing work is less likely to be tested and 
stretched by new forms of reasoning or new observations. This is compounded by the way a 
steep hierarchy makes it costlier to criticize those higher up in the discipline. As Mill noted 
long ago, pressure from criticism and new ideas is a crucial mechanism for identifying errors. 
We can reasonably assume that beliefs that survive such pressure are less likely to be false 
and so are more justified. Putting these points together, no matter how well individual 
methods are followed, the steep hierarchy in economics – a social factor – has a significant 
negative effect. 
 
Similar points can be made about the climate for women and underrepresented minorities; 
that economics is more insular than other social sciences; that it is largely anglophone; and 
that US departments and institutions dominate. Many of these social phenomena attract much 
attention within economics itself, and in the coverage of the profession in the media. But 
methodologists have been mute about them. Given that these phenomena impact on squarely 
methodological topics – objectivity, progress, bias, trust – this muteness is surprising, and 
doubly so given the wealth of readily available data.  
 
Do methodologists in fact consider social organization questions already, just under a 
different name – pluralism (Davis 2014, Salanti and Screpanti 1997)? The two issues are 
related but distinct. Pluralism questions typically concern whether economists do the right 
distribution of things. This is a general version of the efficiency question from earlier. Social 
organization questions are more agnostic about the specific things that economists do, such as 
whether a particular method or school of thought deserves more attention. They focus instead 
on what social inputs are likely to lead to a healthy balance, from the perspective of what we 
know about intellectual inquiry in general. The empirical base of social organization 
arguments is also easier to secure. It is a difficult thing to determine exactly how much 
pluralism is desirable and whether in economics we have the right amount of it, but it is much 
easier to find data showing that economics is hierarchical. 
 
Like the efficiency question, social organizational questions are difficult to answer, involving 
as they do complicated counterfactuals such as whether economics would produce better 
explanations if it were less hierarchical. But, as is also the case with the efficiency question, 
social organizational questions are routinely answered already – implicitly. If you ignore 
gender in a hiring process, implicitly you are assuming that gender representation is not 
important. Or if you highlight that authors in the main journals are concentrated at a few 
universities, implicitly you are asserting that this pattern is concerning.  
 
Social organizational questions offer avenues for exciting new fine-grained work, such as 
whether bigger authorship teams are more innovative or reliable, or whether internet-era 
networks of communication marginalize certain voices. But the social organizational 
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questions that we think especially ripe for methodologists’ scrutiny bear on economics as a 
whole. They become visible only when taking a wider view. Hierarchy, insularity, and 
maleness are all good examples. Methodologists should take their cue from the recent 
philosophy that highlights how knowledge production is affected by different social practices. 
Is economics as currently organized likely to generate a diverse enough range of hypotheses, 
is it likely to spot problems with evidence, are certain criticisms likely to be heard or 
ignored? Careful analysis, grounded in the lessons that philosophers have learnt from other 
scientific endeavors, is surely preferable to dueling tribes on Twitter. 
 
5. Conclusion: big picture reinvented 
Are we urging that future work in our field be about big-picture issues such as the efficiency 
question and the social organization of economics? Yes and no. Yes, because why shouldn’t 
methodology of economics be focused on those aspects of the discipline that at the moment 
most preoccupy the profession itself? No, because, as ever, some philosophically important 
aspects of economics may not be those that practicing economists care to attend to. Besides, 
responsible big-picture work must ride on the back of solid fine-grained foundations, so there 
is a need for both. But we have highlighted a sense in which the balance has shifted. Whereas 
the old school big-picture strategy was based on a relatively narrow picture of science and 
was rightly abandoned in favor of fine-grained work, now a focus on fine-grained work 
carries its own danger. It risks blinding methodologists to seminal changes in economics, 
such as the empirical turn and the rising awareness of disciplinary politics. Each of these 
changes sorely needs to be evaluated, and that requires the return of big-picture work, duly 
reinvented. 
 
Just as every age needs its own art, so every age needs its own methodology of economics. 
After decades of investment in the fine-grained, our age is ready to step back and look again 
at the health of economics as a whole.  
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